Published July 1981
| Version Published
Working Paper
Open
Noncooperative Games, Abstract Economies, and Walrasian Equilibria
Creators
Abstract
The introduction of an additional player to serve as coordinator in an N-person abstract economy leads in a natural way to an N+1-person noncooperative game. Sufficient conditions on the abstract economy are considered which lead to the existence of equilibrium in the resulting game and hence for the abstract economy.
Additional Information
Parts of this working paper were published as Border, Kim C. "A Core Existence Theorem for Games Without Ordered Preferences." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1984): 1537-1542.Attached Files
Published - sswp396.pdf
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sswp396.pdf
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Additional details
Additional titles
- Alternative title
- A Core Existence Theorem for Games Without Ordered Preferences
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 82098
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171004-164203686
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171004-171808719 (URL)
Dates
- Created
-
2017-10-05Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 396