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Items where Person is "Isaac-R-M"
Number of items: 23. 2001Ishikida, Takashi and Ledyard, John and Olson, Mark et al. (2001) Experimental testbedding of a pollution trading system: Southern California's RECLAIM emissions market. In: Research in Experimental Economics. Vol.8. Emerald Group , Bingley, England, pp. 185-220. ISBN 978-0-76230-702-9. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-142725559 1996Camerer, Colin F. and Weigelt, Keith (1996) An Asset Market Test of a Mechanism For Inducing Stochastic Horizons in Experiments. In: Research in Experimental Economics. Vol.6. JAI Press , Greenwich, CT, pp. 213-238. ISBN 1-55938-607-X. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110224-140334251 1991Lynch, Michael and Miller, Ross M. and Plott, Charles R. et al. (1991) Product Quality, Informational Efficiency, and Regulations in Experimental Markets. In: Research in Experimental Economics. Vol.4. JAI Press , Greenwich, CT, pp. 269-318. ISBN 0-89232-652-2. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-150929318 1989Grether, David M. and Plott, Charles R. and Isaac, R. Mark (1989) The Allocation of Scarce Resources: Experimental Economics and the Problem of Allocating Airport Slots. Underground classics in economics. Westview Press , Boulder, Colorado. ISBN 9780813375434. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-140014356 Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1989) Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 20 (2). pp. 214-238. ISSN 0741-6261. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-151348936 1987Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1987) Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions. Social Science Working Paper, 670. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-154413142 1985Plott, Charles R. and Isaac, R. Mark and McCue, Kenneth (1985) Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment. Journal of Public Economics, 26 . pp. 51-74. ISSN 0047-2727. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-144357110 1982Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark (1982) Demand-Revealing Mechanisms for Private Good Auctions. In: Research in Experimental Economics. Vol.2. JAI Press , Greenwich, Conn., pp. 45-61. ISBN 9780892322633. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171117-150056546 Isaac, R. Mark and McCue, Kenneth F. and Plott, Charles R. (1982) Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment. Social Science Working Paper, 428. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171003-133551530 Isaac, R. Mark (1982) Fuel cost adjustment mechanisms and the regulated utility facing uncertain fuel prices. Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (1). pp. 158-169. ISSN 0361-915X. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-153341250 1981Isaac, R. Mark and Plott, Charles R. (1981) Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination. American Economic Review, 71 (3). pp. 448-459. ISSN 0002-8282. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140220-122856028 Grether, David M. and Isaac, R. Mark and Plott, Charles R. (1981) The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity Among Competitors. American Economic Review, 71 (2). pp. 166-171. ISSN 0002-8282. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140220-105902716 Isaac, R. Mark and Plott, Charles R. (1981) The Opportunity for Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade: An Experimental Study. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2 (1). pp. 1-30. ISSN 0167-2681. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140220-115148242 Calvert, Randall L. and Isaac, R. Mark (1981) The inherent disadvantage of the presidential party in midterm congressional elections. Public Choice, 36 (1). pp. 141-146. ISSN 0048-5829. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-154913799 1980Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark (1980) Demand-Revealing Mechanisms for Private Good Auctions. Social Science Working Paper, 351. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-163719005 Grether, David M. and Isaac, R. Mark and Plott, Charles R. (1980) The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity among Competitors. Social Science Working Paper, 350. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-165639532 Isaac, R. Mark (1980) Petroleum price controls when information is a joint product. Land Economics, 56 (2). pp. 181-187. ISSN 0023-7639. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171212-150206496 Isaac, R. Mark (1980) Cooperative Institutions for Sharing in the Oil Industry. Social Science Working Paper, 308. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-162906878 1979Isaac, R. Mark (1979) Fuel Cost Adjustment Mechanisms and the Regulated Utility Facing Uncertain Fuel Prices. Social Science Working Paper, 273. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171016-160303828 Isaac, R. Mark (1979) Petroleum Price Controls When Information Is a Joint Product. Social Science Working Paper, 251. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171212-150650450 Grether, David M. and Isaac, R. Mark and Plott, Charles R. (1979) Alternative Methods of Allocating Airport Slots: Performance and Evaluation. CAB report, 1979. Pasadena, Polynomics Research Laboratories, Inc. , Pasadena, CA. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-113021708 1978Calvert, Randall L. and Isaac, R. Mark (1978) The Inherent Disadvantage of the Presidential Party in Midterm Congressional Elections. Social Science Working Paper, 191. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171023-105730572 Isaac, R. Mark and Plott, Charles R. (1978) Cooperative Game Models of the Influence of the Closed Rule in Three Person, Majority Rule Committees: Theory and Experiment. In: Game Theory and Political Science. New York University Press , New York, pp. 283-322. ISBN 9780814761564. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-153203656 |
