Published September 2003
| Version Published
Working Paper
Open
Virtual Repeated Implementation
Creators
Abstract
We show that in the context of repeated implementation, any social choice rule which realizes all alternatives for a positive (yet arbitrarily small) amount of time is Nash implementable. The results complement those of the virtual implementation literature.
Additional Information
I would like to thank John Ledyard for comments and suggestions. All errors are my own. Published as Chambers, C.P. (2004). Virtual repeated implementation. Economics Letters, 83(2), 263-268.Attached Files
Published - sswp1179.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 79637
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-162153289
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-154509663 (URL)
Dates
- Created
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2017-08-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2020-03-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1179