Published September 2000
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures
- Creators
- Banks, Jeffrey S.
Abstract
I analyze the finite-voter version of the Groseclose and Snyder vote-buying model. I identify how the optimal coalition size varies with the underlying preference parameters; derive necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal ma1onty and universal coalitions to form; and show that the necessary condition for minimal majorities found in Groseclose and Snyder is incorrect.
Additional Information
© 2000 American Political Science Association. This article (previously titled "Buying Minimal Majorities") has benefited greatly from the comments of Tim Groseclose and three anonymous referees, as well as the financial support of the National Science Foundation under grant SES-9975141.Attached Files
Published - 2585839.pdf
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2585839.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 67317
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-152837001
- NSF
- SES-9975141
- Created
-
2016-05-24Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-11Created from EPrint's last_modified field