A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games
We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann–Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or "core") point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed.
© 2006 Springer-Verlag. Received: 22 April 2003. Accepted: 22 March 2004. Published online: 4 April 2006. This paper was completed after Jeff Banks's death. John Duggan is deeply indebted to him for his friendship and his collaboration on this and many other projects. Support from the National Science Foundation, grant numbers SES-9975173 and SES-0213738, is gratefully acknowledged.