Published January 1978
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An Axiomatized Family of Power Indices for Simple n-Person Games
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Abstract
In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices based on the notions of minimal winning coalitions and equal division of payoffs is developed. These indices are axiomatically characterized and compared to other similarly characterized indices. Additionally, a dual family of minimal blocking coalition indices and their characterization axioms is presented.
Additional Information
Published as Packel, Edward W., and John Deegan. "An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games." Public Choice 35.2 (1980): 229-239.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp197.pdf
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sswp197.pdf
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Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 82575
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171023-102413458
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-160146170 (URL)
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- Created
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2017-10-24Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 197