Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published November 2014 | public
Journal Article Open

Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games


We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this setting, e.g., the Shapley value and its weighted variants; however, a characterization of the space of distribution rules that guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium is unknown. Our work provides an exact characterization of this space for a specific class of scalable and separable games that includes a variety of applications such as facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games. Given arbitrary local welfare functions.

Additional Information

© 2014 INFORMS. Received: April 12, 2013; Published Online: May 27, 2014. This research was supported by AFOSR [Grants FA9550-09-1-0538, FA9550-12-1-0359], ONR [Grant N00014-12-1-0643], and NSF [Grants CNS-0846025, CCF-1101470].

Attached Files

Submitted - 1402.3610.pdf


Files (1.4 MB)
Name Size Download all
1.4 MB Preview Download

Additional details

August 22, 2023
August 22, 2023