Published June 2001 | Version Submitted
Working Paper Open

Incomplete Information

Abstract

In interactive contexts such as games and economies, it is important to take account not only of what the players believe about substantive matters (such as payoffs), but also of what they believe about the beliefs of other players. Two different but equivalent ways of dealing with this matter, the semantic and the syntactic, are set forth. Canonical and universal semantic systems are then defined and constructed, and the concepts of common knowledge and common priors formulated and characterized. The last two sections discuss relations with Bayesian games of incomplete information and their applications, and with interactive epistemology -- the theory of multi-agent knowledge and belief as formulated in mathematical logic.

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Identifiers

Eprint ID
79852
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-134049226

Dates

Created
2017-08-07
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2019-10-03
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Caltech Custom Metadata

Caltech groups
Social Science Working Papers
Series Name
Social Science Working Paper
Series Volume or Issue Number
1124