Published June 1977
| metadata_only
Journal Article
Some new impossibility theorems
- Creators
- Ferejohn, John A.
- Grether, David M.
Abstract
Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein [1972] have proved a well-known impossibility theorem for acyclic social preference. They showed that if social preference is acyclic for each configuration of individual preferences, and if the mapping between individual and social preferences satisfies the Pareto axiom, the independence of irrelevant alternatives, and May's positive responsiveness axiom, then there must be an individual i such that for any x and y, xP_iy ⇒ xRy. This individual might be considered a "vetoer."
Additional Information
© 1977 Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82853
- DOI
- 10.1007/BF01718816
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-145356732
- URL
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171027-142652603
- Created
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2017-11-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field