A Correction and Re-Examination of "Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 x 2 Games"
Abstract
Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 x 2 games used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.
Additional Information
We would like to thank participants at the Economic Science Association meetings in Tucson (November, 2008) for valuable feedback. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0551014), the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, and the European Research Council (ERC Advanced grant, ESEI-249433).Attached Files
Published - iewwp437.pdf
Accepted Version - ssrn-id1688964_1_.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 99363
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-104338444
- NSF
- SES 0551014
- Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation
- European Research Council (ERC)
- ESEI-249433
- Created
-
2019-10-18Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-16Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Series Name
- Working paper series (Institute for Empirical Research in Economics)
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 437