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Published May 1985 | public
Journal Article

Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress


In this essay we model appropriations decisions as products of a bilateral bargaining game between a reelection-minded president and Congress. The findings bear out the expectation that the two sides jointly pursue a strategy of accommodation. In awarding appropriations, Congress takes into account the president's preferences embodied in the OMB's budget requests; these requests in turn reflected expectations of congressional action. The evidence also reveals that several important exogenous political and economic variables influence both executive and legislative appropriations decisions.

Additional Information

An earlier version of this essay was delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1983. We would like to thank Roger Noll, Doug Rivers, Linda Cohen, Keith Krehbiel, Robert Browning, Dick Jankowski, Mark Karnlet, David Mowery, and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments and criticisms.

Additional details

August 19, 2023
October 17, 2023