A Theory of Policy Sabotage
Abstract
We develop a theory of policy making that examines when policy sabotage—that is, the deliberate choice by an opposition party to interfere the implementation of a policy—can be an effective electoral strategy, even if rational voters can see that it is happening. In our model, a potential saboteur chooses whether to sabotage an incumbent's policy by blocking its successful implementation. Following this decision, a voter decides whether to retain the incumbent, who is of unknown quality, or to select a challenger.We find that the incentives for sabotage are broadly shaped by the underlying popularity of the incumbent—it is most attractive when an incumbent is somewhat unpopular.If so, sabotage may decrease the probability the incumbent is reelected, even though sabotage is observable to the voter. We illustrate our theory with the implementation of the Affordable Care Act since its passage in 2010.
Additional Information
We thank Peter Buisseret, Laura Doval, Sandy Gordon, Ian Turner, and Craig Volden, and seminar audiences at Emory, New York University Law School, and Yale for helpful comments and suggestions.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp_1453.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 107945
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20210208-083207922
- Created
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2021-02-08Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2022-04-29Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1453