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Published June 17, 2002 | Published
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A multidimensional model of repeated elections


We analyze a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model of elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional policy space. Individuals' policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in "simple" voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game.

Additional Information

© 2001 This item is protected by copyright, with all rights reserved. Original: April 4, 2000; Revised: June 17, 2002. The authors acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation, grant umber SES-9975173. This paper benefited from presentations in seminars at Columbia, MIT, NYU, and Yale and at the 1999 Canadian Economic Theory meetings, the 1999 Latin American Summer Econometric Society meetings, the 1999 American Political Science Association meetings, the 2000 Midwest Political Science Association meetings, the 2000 Social Choice and Welfare meetings, and the 2000 Association of Public Economic Theory meetings.

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