Published February 2004
| Accepted Version
Journal Article
Open
Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities
- Creators
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Echenique, Federico
Abstract
I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.
Additional Information
© 2003 Elsevier Inc. Received 9 December 2001. Available online 21 November 2003. This paper is a revised version of Chapter 2 in my PhD dissertation at U.C. Berkeley. I am very grateful to my advisers, Ilya Segal, and Chris Shannon, for many helpful discussions. I also thank Bob Anderson, Rabah Amir, and Matthew Rabin for their comments. The paper is better thanks to the thoughtful comments of two anonymous referees.Attached Files
Accepted Version - extform.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 20229
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-155427372
- Created
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2010-09-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-08Created from EPrint's last_modified field