Published May 2020 | Version Submitted
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An Energy Sharing Game With Generalized Demand Bidding: Model and Properties

Abstract

This paper proposes a novel energy sharing mechanism for prosumers who can produce and consume. Different from most existing works, the role of individual prosumer as a seller or buyer in our model is endogenously determined. Several desirable properties of the proposed mechanism are proved based on a generalized game-theoretic model. We show that the Nash equilibrium exists and is the unique solution of an equivalent convex optimization problem. The sharing price at the Nash equilibrium equals to the average marginal disutility of all prosumers. We also prove that every prosumer has the incentive to participate in the sharing market, and prosumers' total cost decreases with increasing absolute value of price sensitivity. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium approaches the social optimal as the number of prosumers grows, and competition can improve social welfare.

Additional Information

© 2019 IEEE. Manuscript received April 17, 2019; revised July 13, 2019 and September 6, 2019; accepted October 4, 2019. Date of publication October 10, 2019; date of current version April 21, 2020. This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 51677100 and Grant 51621065, and in part by NSF under Grant CCF 1637598, Grant ECCS 1619352, and Grant CPS 1739355. Paper no. TSG-00571-2019.

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Additional details

Additional titles

Alternative title
An Energy Sharing Game in Prosumers based on Generalized Demand Bidding: Model and Properties

Identifiers

Eprint ID
96742
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20190626-132932886

Related works

Funding

National Natural Science Foundation of China
51677100
National Natural Science Foundation of China
51621065
NSF
CCF-1637598
NSF
ECCS-1619352
NSF
ECCS-1739355

Dates

Created
2019-06-26
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-16
Created from EPrint's last_modified field