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Published August 2, 2017 | Published
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A citizen candidate model with private information and unique equilibrium


We study a citizen candidate model where citizen ideal points are private information and each ideal point is an independent draw from a uniform distribution. We characterize the equilibrium as a function of the entry cost, the office-holding benefit, and the number of citizens. In contrast to the standard citizen candidate models, equilibrium is unique. Entry is from the extremes of the distribution. A citizen enters if and only if her ideal point greater than or equal to some critical distance from the expected median. Expected policies are more extreme as entry costs increase or office-holding benefits decrease, and as the number of citizens increases.

Additional Information

Prepared for presentation at The Workshop on The Political Economy of Democracy, Barcelona, June 5-7, 2008, sponsored by Fundación BBVA, CSIC, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and Universitat Pompeu Fabra. We thank the audience for their comments. Palfrey also acknowledges the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0617820) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. Großer acknowledges the support and hospitality of the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and Economics Department. Published as Großer, J. and Palfrey, T.R. (2009) A Citizen-Candidate Model with Private Information. The Political Economy of Democracy, eds. E. Aragones, C. Bevia, H. Llavador, and N. Scholfield. Madrid, Spain: Fundación BBVA.

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