Published March 1980
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Cooperative Institutions for Sharing in the Oil Industry
Creators
Abstract
Exploration for oil and natural gas often produces an information externality for other resource owners. In isolation, this arrangement can lead to suboptimal exploration patterns. However, private institutions have evolved in the oil industry to provide markets for the external information. In this paper, the exploration process is modeled in a game theoretic framework in which the existence and performance of the private trading institutions are examined.
Additional Information
This research was written partly while the author was funded by the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation and partly while funded by the Caltech Energy Policy Project. Many helpful comments were received from Professors John Ferejohn, Roger Noll, and James Quirk, and from the Economic Theory Workshop.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp308.pdf
Files
sswp308.pdf
Files
(548.9 kB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:51d966b1b2f8d46bf571b0dd386dd99a
|
548.9 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 82332
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-162906878
Funding
- John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation
- Caltech Energy Policy Project
Dates
- Created
-
2017-10-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 308