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Published September 2004 | Accepted Version
Journal Article Open

Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements


In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria—equilibria that are not in pure strategies—are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

Additional Information

© 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc. Received 31 May 2002; Revised 16 October 2003. Available online 5 February 2004. We thank an associate editor and a referee for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. Conversations with and comments of David Blackwell, Vince Crawford, Glenn Ellison, Jeff Ely, Hugo Hopenhayn, Ilya Segal, Chris Shannon, and Matthew Rabin are gratefully acknowledged. We also thank seminar audiences in Berkeley, Caltech, Northwestern, NYU, UCLA, and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella for comments. Aaron Edlin thanks the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for a faculty fellowship.

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