Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection
Congressional scholars have frequently reported dramatic shifts int he mood of Congress toward federal spending. In seeking to explain these fluctuations in congressional moods, we develop and estimate an "electoral connection" model of the congressional appropriations process. In this model appropriations decisions are seen to be the product of the responses of reelection-seeking members of Congress to the key political and economic variables in their environment.
Additional Information© 1985 University of Chicago Press. This paper has benefited greatly from the advice and assistance of Bruce Cain. Jeff Dubin, David Grether, Richard McKelvey, Doug Rivers, and Quong Vuong provided econometric advice. We would also like to thank Bob Bates, Richard Fenno, John Ferejohn, Morris Fiorina, Ed Green, Peter Gourevitch, Mark Kamlet, Keith Krehbiel, Allan Meltzer, Terry Moe, Roger Noll, Ben Page, Howard Rosenthal, Alan Schwartz, and the anonymous referees for their valuable comments and criticisms.