Published March 2003
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Allocation Rules for Network Games
Creators
Abstract
Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.
Additional Information
I thank Jernej Copic, Sergio Currarini, and Gabrielle Demange for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Jackson, M.O. (2005). Allocation rules for network games. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(1), 128-154.Attached Files
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 79723
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-162757854
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-162601118 (URL)
Funding
- Caltech Lee Center for Advanced Networking
Dates
- Created
-
2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1160