Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published September 15, 2017 | Submitted
Report Open

An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity


The paper reports on an experimental investigation of four methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an analysis of these results.

Additional Information

Funding provided by the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is gratefully acknowledged. The comments of Mark Olson (JPL) on the statistical analysis and his computer programming assistance are both acknowledged. Published as Banks, Jeffrey S. and Plott, Charles R. and Porter, David P. (1988) An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms. Review of Economic Studies, 55 (2). pp. 301-322.

Attached Files

Submitted - sswp595.pdf


Files (1.2 MB)
Name Size Download all
1.2 MB Preview Download

Additional details

August 19, 2023
March 5, 2024