Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
Abstract
We study a mechanism design problem where the allocation rule is randomized and transfers are contingent on outcomes. In this problem, an agent reports his private information, and an exogenous randomized allocation rule assigns an outcome based on the report. A planner designs an outcome-contingent transfer to incentivize the agent to report truthfully. We say that the allocation rule is implementable if such transfers exist. For this implementation problem, we derive two sufficient and necessary conditions. Each has a geometric interpretation. Moreover, when the allocation rule is implementable, we construct transfers that implement the allocation rule.
Copyright and License
© 2024 Elsevier Inc.
Additional Information
This paper was circulated with the title “Eliciting Information by Transfer.” We are especially grateful to Luciano Pomatto and Harry Pei for guiding the direction of this project. For helpful comments, we also thank Editor Pierpaolo Battigalli, one Associate Editor, two anonymous referees, Alexander Bloedel, Peter Caradonna, Rafael Frongillo, Wade Hann-Caruthers, Nicolas Lambert, Jonathan Libgober, Elliot Lipnowski, Chang Liu, Axel Niemeyer, Ichiro Obara, Alessandro Pavan, John K.-H. Quah, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Xin Shan, Andrew J. Sinclair, Omer Tamuz, Rakesh Vohra, Xingye Wu, Mu Zhang, conference participants at EC23, seminar participants at Caltech, USC and Tsinghua University.
Contributions
Yi Liu: Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis. Fan Wu: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Conceptualization.
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Additional details
- Alternative title (English)
- Eliciting Information by Transfer
- Accepted
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2024-07-06Accepted
- Available
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2024-07-10Published online
- Publication Status
- Published