Published January 1988
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signalling Equilibrium
Creators
Abstract
A single economic agent controls a variety of activities. Each activity is associated with a privately observed piece of information. The information is relevant to the actions he will take in this activity, and to the vulnerability of this activity to attack by another agent. Actions should be chosen so as partially to hide the private information, as well as to be efficient in the productive sense. This paper gives a characterization of the optimal association of actions to activities based on the private information available. Some applications are discussed.
Additional Information
Revised: Original dated to 1986. Support from the National Science Foundation, grant numbers IST-8310118 and IST-8507291 and Commissariat du Plan is gratefully acknowledged. We thank the referees for their helpful and detailed comments. Published as Green, Jerry, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Competition on many fronts: a Stackelberg signaling equilibrium." Games and Economic Behavior 2, no. 3 (1990): 247-272.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp664_-_revised.pdf
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Additional details
Additional titles
- Alternative title
- Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 81245
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-142614953
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-084200678 (URL)
Funding
- NSF
- IST-8310118
- NSF
- IST-8507291
- Commissariat du Plan
Dates
- Created
-
2017-09-08Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 664