Published October 1985
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
Creators
Abstract
Previous analyses have shown that if a point x is to be a core of a majority rule voting game in Euclidean space, when preferences are smooth, then the utility gradients must satisfy certain restrictive symmetry conditions. In this paper these results are generalized to the case of an arbitrary voting rule, and necessary and sufficient conditions, expressed in terms of "pivotal" coalitions, are obtained.
Additional Information
Revised. Original dated to January 1985. The contribution of the first author is supported, in part, by NSF grant SES-84-09654 to the California Institute of Technology, and that of the second author is based on work supported by NSF grant SES-84-18295 to the School of Social Sciences, University of California at Irvine. We are grateful to Charles Plott and Jeff Strnad for a number of helpful observations. Published as McKelvey, Richard D., and Norman Schofield. "Generalized symmetry conditions at a core point." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1987): 923-933.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp552_-_revised.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 81542
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-145109056
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-161716689 (URL)
Funding
- NSF
- SES-8409654
- NSF
- SES-8418295
Dates
- Created
-
2017-09-19Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 552