Demand Uncertainty and the Regulated Firm
- Creators
- Braeutigam, Ronald R.
- Quirk, James P.
Abstract
Demand uncertainty is an important element of many regulated markets. Firms often must select plant size before actual demand is observed, and with some expectation of regulatory action if the actual levels of profit or rate of return do not fall within accepted ranges. We analyze a model of a regulated firm that faces a relatively complex regime of price regulation, reflecting to at least some extent the multiple aspects suggested by Joskow (1974). The firm behaves as though it expects the current tariff to remain in effect unless, at the actual demand observed after plant size is chosen, one of two things occurs. First, if profits are negative, the firm plans to petition for and expects to receive a new tariff yielding zero economic profits. Second, if the rate of return on capital exceeds some specified maximum, the firm expects the regulator to reduce the tariff so that the firm earns only that maximum.
Additional Information
This research was supported in part under a DOE grant, EY-76-G-03-1305, EQL Block. We also want to thank the Environmental Quality Laboratory at California Institute of Technology for its help and assistance in this research. Published as Braeutigam, Ronald R., and James P. Quirk. "Demand uncertainty and the regulated firm." International Economic Review (1984): 45-60.Attached Files
Published - sswp261.pdf
Files
Name | Size | Download all |
---|---|---|
md5:9597f499cb531da95ce78082fe5dfd20
|
645.9 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82431
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171017-144203932
- Department of Energy (DOE)
- EY-76-G-03-1305
- Created
-
2017-10-18Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 261