Demand Uncertainty and the Regulated Firm

Abstract

Demand uncertainty is an important element of many regulated markets. Firms often must select plant size before actual demand is observed, and with some expectation of regulatory action if the actual levels of profit or rate of return do not fall within accepted ranges. We analyze a model of a regulated firm that faces a relatively complex regime of price regulation, reflecting to at least some extent the multiple aspects suggested by Joskow (1974). The firm behaves as though it expects the current tariff to remain in effect unless, at the actual demand observed after plant size is chosen, one of two things occurs. First, if profits are negative, the firm plans to petition for and expects to receive a new tariff yielding zero economic profits. Second, if the rate of return on capital exceeds some specified maximum, the firm expects the regulator to reduce the tariff so that the firm earns only that maximum.

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