Published March 2011 | Version public
Journal Article

Beating the best Nash without regret

Abstract

Nash equilibrium analysis has become the de facto solution standard in game theory. This approach, despite its prominent role, has been the subject of much criticism for being too optimistic. Indeed, in general games, natural play need not converge to Nash equilibria. In games with multiple equilibria, it is unclear how players are expected to coordinate; even in games with a unique equilibrium, finding it may involve unreasonable expectations on player communication or computation.

Additional Information

© 2011 ACM. Katrina Ligett's work was supported in part by NSF grants 0937060 and DMS-1004416. Georgios Piliouras' work was supported by NSF grants CCF-0325453, AF-0910940, AFOSR grant FA9550-09-1-0420 and ONR grant N00014-09-1-0751.

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
92212
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20190111-090750274

Funding

NSF
CCF-0937060
NSF
DMS-1004416
NSF
CCF-0325453
NSF
AF-0910940
Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)
FA9550-09-1-0420
Office of Naval Research (ONR)
N00014-09-1-0751

Dates

Created
2019-01-11
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-16
Created from EPrint's last_modified field