Published September 1999 | Version Submitted
Working Paper Open

A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions

Abstract

In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Milgrom FCC design (see Milgrom (1995)) and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989)). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. We are able to demonstrate, in both simple and complex environments, that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.

Additional Information

Published as Kwasnica, A.M., Ledyard, J.O., Porter, D., & DeMartini, C. (2005). A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions. Management science, 51(3), 419-434.

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Additional titles

Alternative title
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions

Identifiers

Eprint ID
80271
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-170308555

Dates

Created
2017-08-11
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2019-10-03
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Caltech Custom Metadata

Caltech groups
Social Science Working Papers
Series Name
Social Science Working Paper