Published November 1983 | Version Submitted
Working Paper Open

Perfectly Competitive Markets as the Limits of Cournot Market

Abstract

We consider a perfectly competitive, partial equilibrium market for a single homogeneous good with a (bounded) continuum of infinitesimal firms. Cost functions are essentially unrestricted and are allowed to vary smoothly across firms. We introduce a sequence (net) of Cournot markets (each with a finite number of firms) which converge smoothly to the perfectly competitive limit in terms of both the inverse demand functions and the distribution of firm technologies and show that all markets sufficiently far along the sequence have a Cournot equilibrium and all the Cournot equilibria converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium of the limit market.

Additional Information

This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES79-25690 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. Published as Novshek, William. "Perfectly competitive markets as the limits of Cournot markets." Journal of Economic Theory 35.1 (1985): 72-82.

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Identifiers

Eprint ID
81693
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-134321229

Funding

NSF
SES-7925690

Dates

Created
2017-09-21
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Updated
2019-10-03
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Caltech Custom Metadata

Caltech groups
Social Science Working Papers
Series Name
Social Science Working Paper
Series Volume or Issue Number
499