Published May 2001
| public
Journal Article
Voluntary Implementation
- Creators
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Jackson, Matthew O.
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Palfrey, Thomas R.
Abstract
We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The first approach is static where a state-contingent participation constraint defines an implicit mapping from rejected outcomes into outcomes that are individually rational. We call this voluntary implementation and show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is not voluntarily implementable. The second approach is dynamic where a mechanism is replayed if the outcome at any stage is vetoed by one of the agents. We call this stationary implementation and show that if players discount the future in any way, then the constrained Walrasian correspondence is stationarily implementable.
Additional Information
Copyright 2001 by Academic Press. Received December 4, 1998; final version received September 6, 2000. The authors thank an associate editor, an anonymous referee, and Bhaskar Dutta for helpful comments and suggestions.Errata
Corrigendum published May 2003 to correct error (and several typographical errors) in previous proof of Theorem 2.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65161
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-163541677
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2016-03-25Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2023-06-01Created from EPrint's last_modified field