Published January 1985
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
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Existence of Permutation Cycles and Manipulation of Choice Functions
Creators
Abstract
Let σ be a social preference function, and let v (σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v (σ) then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that σ (P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with a can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v (σ) - 1.
Additional Information
This material is based on work initially supported by a Nuffield Foundation Grant, and completed while the author was a Sherman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of Technology, Particular thanks are due to David Grether, Dick McKelvey and Jeff Strnad for helpful discussion and for making available their unpublished work.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp555.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 81539
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-142711751
Funding
- Nuffield Foundation
- Sherman Fairchild Foundation
Dates
- Created
-
2017-09-19Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 555