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Published September 2024 | Published
Journal Article Open

Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form

  • 1. ROR icon California Institute of Technology

Abstract

In the cognitive hierarchy (CH) framework, players in a game have heterogeneous levels of strategic sophistication. Each player believes that other players in the game are less sophisticated, and these beliefs correspond to the truncated distribution of a “true” distribution of levels. We develop the dynamic cognitive hierarchy (DCH) solution by extending the CH framework to games in extensive form. Initial beliefs are updated as the history of play provides information about players' levels of sophistication. We establish some general properties of DCH and fully characterize the DCH solution for a wide class of centipede games. DCH predicts a strategy-reduction effect: there will be earlier taking if the centipede game is played as an alternating-move sequential game rather than as a simultaneous move game in its reduced normal form. Experimental evidence reported in García-Pola et al. (2020a) supports this prediction. In all three centipede games for which the DCH strategy-reduction effect is predicted, termination occurs earlier when played sequentially rather than simultaneously with reduced strategies. In a fourth centipede game, where this effect is not predicted, it is not observed.

    Contributions

    Po-Hsuan Lin: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft. Thomas R. Palfrey: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft.

    Data Availability

    Data will be made available on request.

    Online Appendix. In this online appendix, we show that DCH predicts the distribution of terminal nodes under the strategy method will first order stochastically dominate the distribution of terminal nodes under the direct response method in CG 1, CG 2 and CG 4 by characterizing the DCH solutions of these games. Besides, we will show that DCH does not predict the FOSD relationship by demonstrating the existence of prior distributions of levels such that the FOSD relationship is violated.

    Acknowledgement

    his paper was previously circulated under the title “Cognitive Hierarchies in Extensive Form Games.” Support from the National Science Foundation (SES-2243268 and SES-2343948) is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Colin Camerer, David Gill, Greg Leo, Rosemarie Nagel, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Omer Tamuz, Joseph Tao-yi Wang and audiences at the 2021 North America Conference of the Economic Science Association and the 2022 Annual SAET Conference for comments on earlier versions and presentations of the paper. We thank the editor Pierpaolo Battigalli, three referees, the associate editor, and Shuige Liu for their detailed and constructive suggestions. We are grateful to Bernardo García-Pola, Nagore Iriberri and Jaromír Kovářík for sharing their data with us.

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    Additional details

    Created:
    June 26, 2024
    Modified:
    June 26, 2024